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Abstract
The growing need to ﬁnd proper countermeasures able to protect critical infrastructures from threats has
addressed the deﬁnition of quantitative methodologies for risk assessment. One of the most diﬃcult aspects
in this topic is the evaluation of the eﬀects of attacks. Attacks Trees represent one of the most used
formalisms in the modeling of attack scenarios: notwithstanding some extensions have been proposed to
enrich the expressiveness of the original formalism, some eﬀort should be spent on their analyzability.
This paper deﬁnes a transformational approach that translates Attack Trees into Bayesian Networks. The
proposed approach can cope with diﬀerent Attack Trees extensions; moreover, it allows the quantitative
evaluation of combined attacks modelled as a set of Attack Trees.
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1 Introduction
The process of securing a system is based on a thorough analysis of the possible
causes of disruptions or violations and of their mutual relations. Such an analysis
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has to be performed by experts that have enough knowledge of the details of the
system, or at least part of it. This activity is traditionally conducted by a top-down
or bottom-up approach, e.g., respectively, if an exploitation has occurred and if an
investigation needs to be conducted using logs, or if the risk of having exploitation
because of a combination of known phenomena has to be evaluated, starting from its
potential elementary causes. Research in automatic support of experts during de-
sign, evaluate and run-time monitoring phases is growing; in particular, in the ﬁeld
of security-related event correlation, ﬁrst methdologies have been presented [7,6]
aiming at the deﬁnition of Decision Support System architectures.
This expert-driven analysis has supported qualitative or semi-quantitative risk
management processes: such activity may strongly beneﬁt from quantitative ap-
proaches as already done in safety analysis. The advantages of having quantitative
risk assessment are the possibility to assess the quality of the proposed protection
solutions and to allow cost-beneﬁt trades. In other words, this analysis may be
oriented not only to ﬁnd out the interrelations and the dependencies, searching for
potential logical implications, but it can also ﬁnd out the conditioned probabilities
of complex events by the probabilities of more elementary events and their relations.
This is to get quantitative measures of the risks that the system can face because
of hostile behaviors.
Since, in the less complex cases, there are multiple and diﬀerent actions that can
lead to a disruption, that in turn can have multiple causes, the analysis generally
produces a tree-structured chain of dependencies: based on this consideration one
of the techniques used in literature for the assessment of security threats has been
dubbed Attack Trees (ATs), and can be used for both qualitative and quantitative
evaluations. ATs are an assessed resource, and they have been shown to be a simple
tool that ﬁts non-experts in the ﬁeld of system modeling.
Security risk assessment can not assume the hypothesis of independent faults as
in safety analysis: the more complex and critical the infrastructure to protect, the
higher will be the probability that attacks will be conducted by diﬀerent actors and
aiming to diﬀerent targets. In this paper, a structured design and analysis method
for ATs is proposed to support the evaluation of the eﬀects of diﬀerent attacks on
the same systems: the approach will be usable by diﬀerent pools of experts.
The resolution method is based on the exploitation of wide-spread combinatorial
probabilistic modeling formalisms, namely Bayesian Networks (BNs). The method
stems from the speciﬁcation of separated ATs for each attack by domain experts
and involves their automatic composition into a single, comprehensive BN model
that encompasses all joined eﬀects. The translation into a formalism with a greater
solving power than BNs, allows us to propose a unifying AT extension where some
of the most interesting extensions proposed by the scientiﬁc literature are included.
The method is applied by a tool that performs the automatic translation of
separated ATs into a BN model and solves it by means of freely available supporting
tools: in particular, the JavaBayes tool is used [12].
The paper is organized as follows: after this introduction, some related works
are presented in Section 2. An overview of the approach is detailed in Section 3.
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Then, Section 4 deﬁnes the ATs variant taken as base for the modeling and solution
process. Section 5 details the transformational process. A case study is presented
in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Attack trees and related works
The ﬁrst publications introducing ATs are [21,22]. In these publications the author
proposes ATs as a convenient means of representing attacks and to support the
systematic analysis of their causes. ATs have been created in the ﬁeld of computer
security, but their applicability is not restricted to this ﬁeld: an application to
homeland security can be found in [4], in which a variant of ATs is used to evaluate
resource allocation with respect to attacks, while in [5] an application to industrial
systems is presented. ATs can be applied whenever a risk that is connected to a
variety of action chains or combinations have to be analyzed, to obtain a general
schema of how that risk is generated. To give an idea of the beneﬁts that can result
from the application of quantitative or qualitative ATs analysis, consider the case in
which a group would aim to exploit an environmental accident to produce a terrorist
attack, by tampering a distributed monitoring system, used by the authorities to
keep polluting agents under control and avoid risks against the population of the
area 4 . ATs are ﬂexible enough to represent conventional computer security attacks,
such as the ones that can be applied to the computer based remote control system, or
sensory loss, or completely diﬀerent threats such as actions based on the corruption
of sensed data by a physical intervention on the sensing nodes (such as artiﬁcial
isolation from the pollution agents), using a single common framework.
A sound presentation of foundations of ATs is given in [17], in which ATs are
formally deﬁned and described, and a very abstract and general semantics is given
to the operators that combine the actions. An example of qualitative applications
of ATs, with a comparison with another technique, can be found in [19,15], while an
example of quantitative application can be found in [4]. The deﬁnition of quantita-
tive semantics in ATs is open to alternatives, and [27] presents a proposal, together
with an interesting bibliographical section about the problem. Some extensions can
also be found in the literature (e.g. see [28,18]).
ATs show some apparent similarity with the more widely known Fault Trees
(FTs) [26], used to evaluate the contribution of faulty components on a system.
Although they share some basic principles (at the point that there has been some
interesting attempt to integrate them, like in [10]), the two techniques are diﬀerent
in many aspects on both conceptual and practical issues. A ﬁrst example is given
by the common eﬀects of event combinations: while diﬀerent faults that can jointly
lead to a higher level fault are generally invariant with respect to their temporal
order, the various actions that compose a single attack must generally be successfully
performed in a given order, thus introducing some order. A second aspect is the
semantic diﬀerence between the fault event and the action: a fault happens, while
the action is intentionally taken by the attacker, that can thus decide how to enact a
4 A similar system is described in [14,1,2].
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strategy in consequence of the success of an action. A third diﬀerence is in the fact
that the structure of an FT model is generally a consequence of the architecture of
the system it represents, and it varies only in the cases in which a design decision
resulting from the analysis requires an architectural redesign; in the case of ATs,
the implementation of a countermeasure as a consequence of the analysis (e.g.,
deciding that a task should be run with user privileges rather than root privilege in
a computer) introduces a number of other possible attack, thus requiring a thorough
revision of the ATs and its extension to consider the new possible actions (and
this stresses the need for more ﬂexible tools). Many other slight or substantial
diﬀerences can be pointed out, sometimes stemming from advanced versions of the
two formalisms: for example, while in FTs it is easily possible to represent repair
policies without big changes in the practical use (e.g. see [20,9]), the introduction
of the analogous in ATs is far less straightforward (e.g. see [16]).
3 The overall approach
Assuming that a formalization of ATs is given, the problem of solving AT models is
discussed: the focus of this Section is on the solution process that aims to provide
quantitative results. The approach relies on transformational techniques as a mean
to generate a more analyzable model for a more usable one. The process can be
considered as composed by four steps in pipeline: system analysis, model synthesis,
model evaluation and results evaluation.
The ﬁrst phase, system analysis, consists of the systematic acquisition and ex-
amination of the characteristics of the system to analyze; it also considers the in-
teractions between the system and the relevant part of the environment in which
it operates. In this phase, expertise in the system and the environment is required
and an architectural reference model is produced. The structure of the system can
be composed of a huge number of heterogeneous elements and subsystems that can
be devoted to very diﬀerent tasks. The analysis continues with the detection of pos-
sible misuses and attacks to the infrastructures as well as the deﬁnition of proper
countermeasures: consequently, besides the expertise on the system, also speciﬁc
expertise in threates and protection systems is required.
The second phase, model synthesis, aims to translate the knowledge about the
system, the environment and the interactions into an representation easier to eval-
uate. Note that in this phase other expertise is required, focusing on model de-
sign rather than system analysis. Obtaining a single, comprehensive model implies
a good integration and coordination process to put together homogeneously and
without mismatches the outputs of the ﬁrst phase. In this paper, model synthesis
is performed by means of ATs.
The third phase, model evaluation, is rarely a mechanical enactment of a compu-
tation: it is more commonly a critical review of the model to ﬁt it with the evaluation
tools, taking into account their practical limitations. While the choice of the most
comfortable and ﬂexible tools can help, better computing resource management and
faster and more precise computation features are in general more important in the
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Fig. 1. Description of the process
case of large models.
Obviously the last phase, results evaluation, is the goal of the process, as it can
feed back to the system analysis and model synthesis phases to obtain, by iterated
application of the pipeline during the analysis cycle, the achieved quality in the
analysis and the needed performances of the system.
A structured approach to the problem is needed to scale up the dimensions of the
systems that can be analyzed, to support composition of partial results of the ﬁrst
phases into a single model in the second phase and to allow ﬂexibility in the third
phase. In this case, since the AT must generally be redesigned each time a counter-
measure is implemented, the most of the burden in the process is concentrated in
a continuous revision of the ﬁrst two phases, and mutual inﬂuences of components
have to be considered. Compositionality is an important tool that consistently sup-
ports the integrations of diﬀerent contributions in modeling frameworks [13,11]. The
presented approach takes in account the relevant advantages that derive from allow-
ing separate groups to perform the system analysis and model synthesis phases by
introducing an intermediate step of model composition between the model synthesis
and the model evaluation phases. This phase, namely model processing, is devoted
to a further synthesis that composes the outputs of the second phase that can be
considered (submodels) in a single comprehensive model. A general description of
the ﬁnal process is given in Figure 1.
The introduction of compositionality enables other features that can speed up or
make less expensive the process, for example it fosters reuse of submodels 5 . More-
5 Even if, as seen, every modiﬁcation to the system can heavily impact on the whole model, there could be
subsystems that are already known to show a low degree of interdependency or a low impact with respect
to the rest of the system. In these cases, they can be reused as they are introducing an approximation, until
their contribution becomes signiﬁcant, to limit the cost of the process.
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Fig. 2. Details of the model processing phase
over, this new phase is also exploited to implement the integrations introduced in
this paper to basic ATs and to adapt the synthesized model to the chosen solver,
decoupling the representation of the model, implemented by ATs, from the imple-
mentation of the model, that is given in a form that is suited for the chosen solver.
This decoupling allows the use of alternative tools in the model solution phase,
based on formalisms that are not necessarily dependent from ATs, nor trivially re-
lated: this can be exploited to transparently switch to a more powerful solver for
ATs once available, or to resort to more ﬂexible solvers that use more general for-
malisms (as shown in this paper using BNs), to leverage some characteristic that
the new formalism may have and ATs do not, or to integrate the process in wider
design processes. All these operations can be designed and organized to be per-
formed automatically, by means of a proper software components, to isolate the
actors of the process from the complexity of this phase and to make it transparent
to the process.
Bayesian Networks are a proper formalism for our purposes since they can im-
prove ATs by eliminating the constraint of having a tree structure. The graph
nature of a BN model allows the presence of common ancestors and the merging of
diﬀerent ATs. Notwithstanding they have not the expressive power of state-based
formalisms as Petri Nets (PNs), it allows other interesting features such as multi-
valued nodes and arbitrary functions in the nodes (with respect to Fault Trees).
BNs are also much easier to solve then PNs since they can be analyzed by means
of eﬃcient combinatorial algorithms instead of time consuming state space con-
struction techniques: with respect to Fault Trees, the complexity of the solution
algorithms is slight greater.
The internal details of the modeling processing phase are depicted in Figure 2.
The ﬁgure shows that the modeling processing phase is in turn organized in a
pipeline of 2 sub-phases, namely the submodel composition and the model trans-
formation sub-phases. The ﬁrst is in charge of coordinating and properly fusing
together all the ATs submodels, eventually with contributions from a submodel
repository, that is a library of already known ATs submodels. The second is in
charge of transforming the output ATs into the model that will be actually evalu-
ated, that in this paper, as announced, is a BN. Details about the ﬁrst are not in the
scope of this paper; Section 5 is dedicated to the description of the transformations
performed by the second.
M. Gribaudo et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 310 (2015) 91–11196
4 Formal Description of Attack Trees
In this Section a deﬁnition of ATs is proposed unifying most of the concepts present
in some scientiﬁc papers referred in Section 2.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Single Attack Tree) Let SAT be a Single Attack Tree,
SAT =< V,E, ϑ, χ, ρ, ε >, where < V,E > is a tree on the set of nodes V and
the set of directed edges E; e = (vs, vd) ∈ E means that there is an arc from vs to
vd, nodes of V .
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Parent Node Set) Given a SAT and v ∈ V , V Pv is the parent
node set of v: V Pv = {vp ∈ V | (vp, v) ∈ E}.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Child Node Set) Given a SAT and v ∈ V , V Cv is the child node
set of v: V Cv = {vc ∈ V | (v, vc) ∈ E}.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Leaf Node Set) Given a SAT , VL is the leaf node set: VL =
{v | V Cv = ∅}. The nodes in VL represent initial steps of an attack.
Deﬁnition 4.5 (Intermediate Node Set) Given a SAT , VI is the intermediate
node set: VI = {v | V Cv = ∅}. The nodes in VI represent intermediate steps of an
attack.
By construction, V = VI ∪ VL and VI ∩ VL = ∅.
Deﬁnition 4.6 (Final SAT target) Given a SAT , t ∈ V is the top node of the
tree so that V Pt = ∅. This node models the ﬁnal asset an attacker wants to compro-
mise. Since the graph structure is a tree, ∀ SAT, ∃! t top node.
Deﬁnition 4.7 (Operator Function) Given a SAT ,
ϑ : v ∈ VI −→ {AND,SEQ,OR,KooN} is the operator function of the tree; for
each intermediate node it assigns the an operator determining a condition according
to which the attack step modeled by the node may be accomplished. These conditions
are:
• AND: all the steps related to child nodes are accomplished;
• SEQ: all the steps related to child nodes are accomplished in a speciﬁed order;
• OR: at least one of the step related to a child node is accomplished;
• KooN: at least k of the n steps related to child nodes are accomplished.
Deﬁnition 4.8 Given a SAT , χ : v ∈ VI −→ N0: χ(v) =
{
0, ϑ(v) = KooN
k, otherwise
.
The value of this function represents the value of k in case of KooN node as speciﬁed
in the Deﬁnition 4.7. The following is true: ∀v ∈ VI , χ(v) ≤ |V Cv |.
Deﬁnition 4.9 (Attack Resilience Function) Given a SAT , ρ : v ∈ V −→
R
+. This function assign to each node the probability that the system resists the
attack.
Deﬁnition 4.10 (Ordered Attack Function) Given a SAT , ε : e ∈ E −→ N+0 .
This function assigns to an edge directed to a node labeled as SEQ, the order of
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the parent in the sequence of the attack; otherwise is zero. Given e = (vs, vt) ∈ E,
ε(e) =
{
n > 0, ϑ(vt) = SEQ
0, otherwise
.
Let now formalise an Attack Tree Set as a collection of attacks modeled as a set
of SATs.
Deﬁnition 4.11 (Attack Tree Set) An Attack Tree Set ATS is deﬁned as a cou-
ple < AT, r >.
Deﬁnition 4.12 Given an ATS, AT is as set of SATs: AT =
{SAT1, SAT2, . . . , SATN}.
Deﬁnition 4.13 (Attack Tree Set Relation) Given an ATS and deﬁning V =⋃N
k=1 Vk the union of all the set of the nodes of each SAT , r ⊂ V ×V is a relation.
Two nodes belonging of two diﬀerent SAT s are related by the Attack Tree Set
Relation if they model attack steps that are strongly coupled each other. We can
assume that the eﬀects of a node of a tree are propagated into the trees containing
nodes that are related. The Attack Tree Set Relation is an equivalence relation since
it is reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive. Hence, the relation generates a quotient
set V/r, i.e. the partition of V containing the equivalence classes induced by r.
Such models can be depicted by means of graphical diagrams where nodes may
be enriched by the information of the functions ϑ, χ and ρ while arcs may be
labeled with the order of the parent nodes in case of SEQ nodes. In an ATS, the
diﬀerent trees can be drawn independently while the relation between two nodes is
represented by a dashed undirected arc. Furthermore, modern modeling approaches
can beneﬁt of the generation of user-friendly graphical user interfaces in order to
automatically generate models ready to be transformed.
Figure 3 depicts an ATS of an energy provider: diﬀerent attacks aim to destroy
diﬀerent assets of the company; Figure 3(a) is directed on the services the com-
pany oﬀers while in Figure 3(b) the attacker wants to destroy the security system.
Diﬀerent SATs are usually generated by diﬀerent modeling teams and domain ex-
perts: hence, while the ﬁrst SAT focuses more on information security, the second
is oriented to physical security. But shutting down the service may provoke a black-
out (due to the nature of the company) and vice versa. Thus an Attack Tree Set
Relation is used to model such situation.
Here two additional deﬁnitions are reported.
Deﬁnition 4.14 (Ancestor Node Set) Given a SAT and v ∈ V , V Av is
the ancestor node set of v. V Av = {va ∈ V | ∃ a sequence of edges
(t, v1), (v1, v2), . . . , (vi, va)(va, vi+1), . . . , (vn−1, vn)(vn, v)}, i.e. a sequence of edges
that starts from the root of the tree t, passes through va and ends in v.
Deﬁnition 4.15 (Descendant Node Set) Given a SAT and v ∈ V , V Dv is the
descendant node set of v. V Dv = {x ∈ V | v ∈ V Ax }, i.e. the subset of nodes for
which v is an ancestor.
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Fig. 3. Example of Attack Trees
5 Transforming Attack Trees into Bayesian Networks
Model-to-Model (M2M) transformations aim at changing source models into other
models, also expressed in diﬀerent formalisms. The main motivation is that the
new model enables analyses to be performed that are not feasible in the previous
formalism [23]. Notwithstanding model transformations can be implemented by
general purpose languages such as C and Java, there are a lot of languages spe-
ciﬁc for model transformation (e.g. Atlas Transformation Language, Query View
Transformation, etc.). Such languages usually contain both declarative and imper-
ative parts: nevertheless, they encourage the use of declarative style in specifying
transformations.
In this Section, a M2M generating a BN model from an ATS is shown: other
approaches generating BNs in the ﬁeld of vulnerability evaluation are present in
literature [3].
5.1 Steps of the model transformation
The proposed transformation can be divided into three steps: the ﬁrst is in charge
of transforming each SAT of an ATS into a BN, the second relates generated BN
according to the Attack Tree Set Relation and the third simpliﬁes the resulting BN.
An overview of these steps is in Figure 4.
Step 1: SAT-to-BN
As combinatorial formalisms, Bayesian Networks cannot precisely model the
SEQ operator since they do not allow taking into account state and time depen-
dent properties. However, it is possible to approximate the SEQ operator by the
AND. In fact, since the SEQ requires the occurrence of events in a certain or-
der, the set of cases in which e.g. SEQ(EV1, EV2) is true is a subset of the set in
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BN
model
SATi
SATj Step 1
Step 2
refines
refines
Step 3
Fig. 4. Overview of the model transformation
Table 1
CPT of simple nodes
slave = true slave = false
1-ρi(v) ρi(v)
which AND(EV1, EV2) is true. Thus, by substituting the SEQ with AND, we are
overestimating the probability of success of an attack. Since design and assessment
process often work by means of considering the worst case, this approximation does
not constitute a problem.
Given an ATS =< AT, r > and SATi =< Vi, Ei, ϑi, χi, ρi, εi >∈ AT, ∀i ∈
{1 . . . n}, the transformation works according to the following rules; ∀SATi ∈ AT:
• ∀v ∈ Vi, a couple of BN variables are created: a “master” and a “slave” where
the last one is a parent of the former. All the variables are binary and assume
values in {true, false}, where true means that the attack step succeeds. The
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) of the slave is built as follows:
· v is a leaf node: CPT is built on the values of ρi: ρi(v) is the probability that
the value of the generated BN slave variable is false, since it is the probability
to resist the attack step. Thus, simple CPTs can be generated as in Table 1;
· v is an intermediate node: CPT is built on the values of the three functions of
the node ϑi, χi, ρi. In fact, CPTs can implement logical operator (deﬁned by
ϑi, χi) as well as probabilistic conditions (ρi). Table 2 reports the CPT of the
slave in case of ϑi = AND: the CPT is built supposing two input nodes (EV1
and EV2 in the table). Other examples of CPTs are in [8];
• ∀e ∈ Ei, an arc is created from the BN “master” variable generated from the
child in the SAT to the BN “slave” variable generated by the parent in the SAT ;
An example of the application of this step is in Figure 5.
Step 2: ATS-to-BN
The second step of the transformation takes into account the ATS Relation r.
More speciﬁcally, the transformation reﬁnes the BNs generated at the previous step
on the base of the information contained into the ATS Relation r.
We consider the BNs generated in the previous step and the quotient set (V )/r.
The BN master variables generated from all the SAT nodes belonging to the same
partition are collapsed into a single BN variable. This variable has all the slave
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Table 2
CPT of AND nodes
EV1 EV2 slave = true slave = false
false false 0 1
false true 0 1
true false 0 1
true true 1-ρi(v) ρi(v)
Fig. 5. Example of translation of a SAT
variables of the SAT nodes as parents, and the union of all the children of the
generating BN variables as children. CPTs implementing a logical OR 6 are added
to these BN variables. Figure 6 shows an example of the application of this rule:
Figure 6(a) depicts the initial ATS, Figure 6(b) the BN resulting from the applica-
tion of the ﬁrst step, Figure 6(c) the combination of the two BNs by means of the
second step of the transformation.
There are some cases of r where it is not possible to generate the BN for ATS
but only for each single SAT . This condition of translatability is related to the fact
that the BNs are based on directed acyclic graphs and then, every relation that
induces a cycle in the BN structure cannot be considered: a formal deﬁnition of the
conditions of translatability is outside of the scope of the paper. A sample case of
ATS not fulﬁlling the translatability condition is reported in Figure 7.
Step 3: postprocessing
After the second step, there may be some BN “master” variables that have not
been combined among them: these nodes can be removed from the BN. The last step
of the model transformation is in charge of providing such simpliﬁcation in order to
6 That is the classical truth table of an OR.
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Fig. 6. Example of translation of ATS relation
Fig. 7. A non-translatable Attack Tree Set
reduce the complexity of the model. Please note that, even if possible, eliminating
dummy master variables related to Final SAT Target Nodes could make the analysis
phase more complex: for simplicity they will be not eliminated. As example, the
model in Figure 6(c) could be simpliﬁed into the one of Figure 8.
5.2 Analysis of resulting BN
The translation of the ATS into a BN allows system designers and assessors to
evaluate not only the probability of success of a single SAT but also to evaluate the
eﬀects of combination of attacks.
We can analyse the resulting BN by means of two methods:
• the prior probability : the likelihood of occurrence of an event before any evidence.
We would use this method in order to obtain the probabilities of success of the
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Fig. 8. Example of ﬁnal optimised model
attacks described in the SAT s when all the attacks are undertaken against the
infrastructure. These probabilities are evaluated by computing the probability
distribution of the “master” variables of the top nodes of the SATs;
• the posterior probability : the likelihood of occurrence of an event given the ob-
servation of some facts. We would use this method to obtain the probabilities
of success of the attacks described in the SAT s when some of the attacks are
undertaken against the infrastructure. These probabilities are evaluated by com-
puting the probability distribution of the “master” variables of the top nodes of
the SATs when:
· the BN “slave” variables corresponding to the leaf nodes of the SAT modeling
the active attacks are observed true;
· the BN “slave” variables corresponding to the leaf nodes of the SAT modeling
the non-active attacks are observed false;
6 An application to railways
As a case study, we model attacks against railway systems. In order to use realistic
assumptions, we start from the work available in [25]. The analysis shows several
criticalities of a railroad infrastructure.
First railroad cannot be physically monitored in their entire extension: hun-
dreds of miles of railroads are thus inevitably open for attacks of multiple nature
by diﬀerent attackers, that can use tools of diﬀerent nature. Another vulnerability
occurs at points where cargo is transferred from one mode of transportation to the
other mainly from ships to rail. The extremely high number of cargoes loaded onto
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trains makes it physically impossible to examine each container, where dangerous
materials could have been hidden. If there is a security breach in the port author-
ities, this causes a breach also to the railway system. Another major vulnerability
comes from unauthorized access to train schedule databases. Such archives contain
schedules for shipment of sensitive materials: the knowledge of this information
can lead to focused attacks that can target hazardous materials in sections where
checks are less tight, dramatically increasing the eﬀects of a usually less harmful
action. A fourth criticality is connected to the commercial implications of train
transportation especially for passenger trains. For train companies not to loose
business in favor of other means of transportation, security checks must be reduced
at minimum. Together with high predictability due to the ﬁxed train schedule, this
poses a threat to the infrastructure itself. A ﬁnal problem is that usually railroad
security is not the responsibility of a single agency, but it is shared among several
authorities. The separation of roles increases the probability of security gaps, since
every agency might think that some other institution should have already covered a
particular problem. On the contrary, if a particular point is covered by more than
one agency, this brings to a waste of funds that could be used on securing other
vulnerabilities.
If we then focus on the possible attacks that can be aimed at railways, they
could be grouped into three main groups. The ﬁrst type of attack is the destruction
of trains or railways themselves. As an eﬀect, this attack type could also target the
vicinity of the railways. Bombs on the railway or on the train itself can be an imple-
mentation of this type of attack. As outlined above, targeting trains transporting
hazardous materials can increase the eﬀect of this type of attack. Another way of
performing this attack is by derailing a targeted train, for example by attacking
a bridge just before the train crosses it, or by placing large vehicles on railroad
crossings.
The second type of attacks includes hi-jacking of trains: this is particularly
probable if the content of the carriages has some value for the attackers. Access to
schedule databases or their corruption, by remote or physical access, can increase
the probability of this type of attack.
The last form of attack is by breaching conﬁdential railway databases by either
an electronic attack, or by physically obtaining the information on site. In many
cases, this type of attack can be considered as a ﬁrst step of one of the two previ-
ously considered forms of attack since it allows the formulation of better and more
successful plans. Another form of this type of attack can be conducted by altering
the time tables and the schedules of the trains: this can lead either to head on
collisions, or to extreme confusion which can move security resources from the real
target to fake problematic areas. Database attacks usually occurs in several steps
and diﬀerent forms: see for example [24].
In Fig. 9, we present an ATS model that relates a possible railroad attack with
other forms of attacks: a bombing attack as consequence of unchecked cargo on
a ship, a command and control system takeover from an electronic attack, and a
biochemical threat, exploiting the payload of the train. Speciﬁc experts describe
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each scenario: a railroad security expert, a maritime security expert, a biochemical
threats expert and a network security expert. Although the four types of threats
seem to be uncorrelated, they intersect in some points, and can be part of a large
scale attack that tries to fulﬁll several goals at the same time. In particular, an
explosion of a train cart can cause a biochemical threat. The explosion can be
caused by a breach in the maritime security when cargo is transferred from a boat to
the railway. Hijacking of a train can be the consequence of an electronic attack that
aims to takeover the command and control of the railway authorities by corrupting
data. Note that the presence of some attack step in two diﬀerent ATs is not due to
incomplete modeling of the case, but to the fact that attackers in diﬀerent conditions
and with diﬀerent skills can provoke the same damage with diﬀerent sets of actions
(e.g., data corruption can be obtained remotely by a network based attack or from
inside the railway administration by direct personal actions).
Using the techniques proposed in Section 5, the model presented in Fig. 9 can
be analyzed. In particular Fig. 10 shows the four Bayesian networks corresponding
to the four diﬀerent forms of attack considered in the example. Then, by applying
steps 2 and 3 of the technique proposed in Section 5, the four components are fused
in single Bayesian network, and the redundant nodes are removed, as shown in
Fig. 11. We can then analyze the model using the JavaBayes tool, to ﬁrst study
the scenario without speciﬁc hypotheses, and to see how the probability of being
subject to a given attack changes when some of the events corresponding to the top
level nodes are observed.
Cross eﬀects of the attack set (success probability) on:
Chemical Railway Maritime Comm. Contr.
Chemical 0.646864 0.060840 0 0
Maritime 0.352240 0.045288 0.008000 0
Comm. Contr. 0.350000 0.045000 0 0.728164
Railway 0.567379 0.087387 0 0.021600
Rail. + Mar. 0.567880 0.087447 0.008000 0.021600
Whole BN 0.679942 0.092992 0.008000 0.732289
Table 3
Results: in each row, the subsystem or combination of subsystems with enabled attacks is speciﬁed on the
left.
The model allows to analyze the isolated or combined impact of every elementary
attack on any event that is in the BN, but presenting all the results would be
dispersive and not useful for the goals of this paper. Here is instead presented a set
of results that show how it is possible to apply this technique to analyze the mutual
contributions to vulnerabilities of a system with respect to the others.
Table 3 presents the outcomes of the analysis performed on the model. Each
value in the table represents the eﬀect, in terms of success probability, of creating a
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Fig. 9. AT for the case study
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Fig. 10. BN for the railroad threat (a), the chemical threat (b), the maritime threat (c) and the command
and control threat (d) parts of the case study
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Fig. 11. Overall BN for the threats
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damage against the subsystem indicated in the column when all possible elementary
attacks to the subsystem indicated in the row are enabled, considering all the other
elementary attacks related to other subsystems as impossible. The value in the cell
at i-th row and j-th column represents the probability that the i-th attack causes
propagate on the j-th top node.
The last two rows are related to the combined case between Maritime and Rail-
way, which are connected, and to the case in which all possible elementary attacks
are enabled (that is the most realistic situation in practice). Row 5 has been added
as the maritime related attack appears as a part of the AT of the railway related
attack, so the case has been considered in which all the elementary threats related
to the other three attacks are observed as impossible: this case shows that the
consequences of an attack to the maritime subsystem are not crucial for the rail-
way subsystem, as results are not altered with respect to the ones in row 4. The
last row shows the results when all elementary threats are possible and can conse-
quently happen: in this case the mutual inﬂuences actually show their eﬀects, but
it is obviously not possible to observe them independently.
These results are useful for a comparative analysis, aimed to support decisions
on system enhancements. As expected, when the chemical subsystem is attacked,
i.e. all the leaf nodes of the Bio-chemical Threats SAT represent an active at-
tack, the Maritime Security and Network Security SATs are not aﬀected (and thus
their attack likelihood is zero) while the Railroad Security SAT is aﬀected since
its Explosion intermediate node is related to the Explosion intermediate node of
the Bio-chemical Threats SAT. Diﬀerent choices of enable elementary attacks allow
other analyses, according to the desired goals of the evaluation.
7 Conclusions
This paper deﬁnes a translational method for the automatic generation of a BN
from a set of ATs. The approach is motivated by the necessity of having a process
and a formalism able to provide a quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of success
of attacks even if in case of combined attacks with mutual and non-trivial inﬂuences
between them. The approach is applied on a railway case study where inﬂuences
between attacks aimed to hit trains and attacks aimed to hit facilities are studied,
modeled by means of Attack Trees and then analyzed by means of existing analysis
tools on the generated BN model.
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